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Abstract
Over the past thirty years the prison population in the United States has rapidly
increased to the point that the U.S. now has the largest prison population in the world.
How did this happen? Through research, this thesis will argue that mass incarceration is a
direct result of the war on drugs and tough on crime policies dating back to the 1970’s.
These policies largely targeted the urban poor and minorities. With a rapid increase in the
prison population during 1980’s, state governments began to look to the private sector for
a more cost-effective alternative. Private prison companies started with immigration
detention centers and later gained state contracts. After multiple scandals ranging from
escapes, violence, and neglect these companies backed away from state contracts. They
returned to immigration detention centers bringing with them all they had learned from
operating prisons.
Keywords: mass incarceration, war on drugs, private prison industry, detention
centers
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Introduction
The United States accounts for only five percent of the world population, yet
accounts for twenty-five percent of the worlds prison inmates.1 This is a statistic that is
often thrown around in the media today with little to no explanation as to how the nation
of the free is also home to the world's largest prison population. How can the United
States have more prisoners than countries with greater populations like China and
Russia? Is the United States inherently more violent and crime ridden than other
countries? The simple answer is no, the United States is not more violent or prone to
crime. The U.S. simply has a long history of punitive responses to medical and
rehabilitative issues. These punitive responses increased the prison population, increased
time served, and created systems of recidivism. With increased prison populations all
over the country, state governments sought alternatives to taxpayer incarceration. Private
companies promised a cheaper and effective form of incarceration. These companies cut
costs in crucial areas that endangered their employees and inmates. After numerous
scandals and lawsuits, these companies returned to operating immigration detention
centers. These immigrants are less likely to file complaints against these companies for
the inhumane conditions and treatment.
The first section will argue that tough on crime policies and the war on drugs,
dating back to the 1970’s, caused the mass incarceration seen today. Beginning with the
Nixon administration and his tough on crime policies, believing in a connection between

1

Kilgore, James. Understanding Mass Incarceration : A People's Guide to the Key Civil
Rights Struggle of Our Time. La Vergne: The New Press, 2015. p. 1
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drug use and crime. Followed by the Reagan administration who intensifies the war on
drugs and revitalizes mandatory minimum sentencing. Then the Clinton administration
who arguably made the most lasting effect through the passing of the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 and others that barred felons from accessing
federal assistance. Lastly, this section will address the racial disparity within the prison
population and the effectiveness of mass incarceration.
Section two will analyze the rise of private prison companies seeking to capitalize
on overburdened state and federal prisons. Companies like Corrections Corporation of
America (CCA) rose to the occasion when states were struggling to balance budgets. Forprofit companies offered what appeared to be viable cost-effective alternatives to state
and federal prisons. These companies promised to maintain quality while cutting costs.
The ways in which these companies cut costs has in many cases endangered prison
guards and the inmates themselves. More importantly these companies have lobbied
against prison reform and have financially backed political candidates that are tough on
crime. These companies will continue to campaign for tough on crime policies in order to
maintain profitability, preventing meaningful sentencing and prison reform.
Section three will then analyze the shift of private prison companies back towards
immigrant detention centers. Increased criminalization of immigrants resulted in the
United States also becoming the largest detention nation. The federal government once
again sought financial alternatives. Private prison companies have been shifting back
towards operating detention centers in recent years after numerous lawsuits and scandals
within their state prisons. These facilities are operated similarly to prisons, unfortunately
immigrant detainees are not afforded the same rights as U.S. inmates and are vulnerable

6
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to abuse. Private companies have begun using many of the same cost cutting measures
and lobbying efforts they used for private prisons in an effort to increase the immigrant
detainee population.

I.

The Rise of Mass Incarceration

The Nixon Administration
“We must declare and win the war against the criminal elements which threaten
our cities, our homes and our lives.”2. This is a quote from President Nixon’s State of the
Union Address in 1970. Nixon's policies greatly contributed to the mass incarceration
problem that is seen today. During his presidency, Nixon advocated for law and order and
took a tough on crime approach. He went as far as to declare illegal drugs, “public enemy
number one,”3 and was the first President to use the term “war on drugs”. He believed
that higher conviction rates would lower the crime rate4. He wanted higher conviction
rates of drug users and distributors believing in a link between increased drug use and
increased crime in the country. In order to achieve this, he tripled the federal law

2

Kilgore, James. Understanding Mass Incarceration : A People's Guide to the Key Civil
Rights Struggle of Our Time. La Vergne: The New Press, 2015. p. 29
3

Wood, E., Werb, D., Marshall, B. D. L., Montaner, J. S. G., & Kerr, T. (2009). The war
on drugs: A devastating public-policy disaster. The Lancet, 373(9668), p. 989.
4

Andre Douglas Pond Cummings, "All Eyez on Me: America's War on Drugs and the
Prison-Industrial Complex," Journal of Gender, Race & Justice 15, no. 3 (Spring 2012):p.
418
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enforcement budget5. He also signed a bill creating the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
during his final year as president.
The Nixon administration also created an important piece of public policy; the
Controlled Substance Act (CSA) or the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970. This act is significant as it is the first of its kind to consolidate all
drug policies into one piece of legislation that is enforced by the newly created DEA.
Prior to this, drugs like marijuana and heroin had separate pieces of legislation that
governed their use, distribution, and sentencing. The CSA resulted in the creation of drug
scheduling or classifications that are still in use today. Drugs are scheduled based on their
potential for addiction and their medicinal uses, or lack thereof.6 Marijuana for example
is classified as a schedule 1 drug with the likes of heroin. It was believed to be highly
addictive and hold no medicinal purposes. These classifications also determined
sentencing for distribution and possession. Possession of any illegal drug always resulted
in a misdemeanor on the first offense.7 The penalties of a repeated offense may result in a
felony and depending on the scheduling, sentencing and fines varied. The DEA and the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) created these scheduling guidelines
and continues to monitor drug distribution and handling.8 This is one of the first policies
that began the rapid increase of non-violent drug offenders in the prison population.

5

Kilgore, James. Understanding Mass Incarceration : A People's Guide to the Key Civil
Rights Struggle of Our Time. La Vergne: The New Press, 2015. p. 29
6

The Controlled Substances Act." 6.2 Drug Enforcement 2, 9 (1979) p. 6

7

Ibid p. 6
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Ibid p. 4
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Despite all of Nixon’s tough on crime policies, the crime rate only further increased
during his presidency and his policies failed to garner wide public support.9 He did
succeed in increasing the number of convictions and the prison population since the
1970s has increased by more than six times.10 According to the Bureau of Justice
Statistics the prison population upon the election of Nixon in 1969 was 196,007 in state
and federal prisons.11 By the end of Nixon’s presidency in 1974 the prison population
rose to 218,466, which may appear to be a rather small increase. 1974 is an important
year because the prison population increased by 150,000 in the eight years that followed.
This was the largest recorded increase in U.S. history at the time. The prison population
would continue to rise rapidly after Nixon’s presidency and many researchers deem this
to be the start of mass incarceration. President Nixon’s tough on crime rhetoric tapped
into the public's fear of crime and violence. The Republican party continued to tap into
this fear for years to follow.
The Reagan Administration
President Ronald Reagan is attributed with creating a moral panic within the
country concerning drug use and escalating the war on drugs.12 Where President Nixon
failed to garner public support for the war on drugs, President Reagan made the issue a

9

Kilgore, James. Understanding Mass Incarceration : A People's Guide to the Key Civil
Rights Struggle of Our Time. La Vergne: The New Press, 2015. p. 40
10

Gottschalk, M. (2011), The past, present, and future of mass incarceration in the United
States. Criminology & Public Policy, 10:p. 483
11
Bureau of Justice Statistics
Hawdon, James E. “The Role of Presidential Rhetoric in the Creation of a Moral Panic:
Reagan, Bush, and the War on Drugs.” Deviant Behavior 22, no. 5 (September 30, 2001):
p. 426
12
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national epidemic. In the early 1980s only about, 2 percent of the American public
viewed the drug problem as a national issue. By the end of 1980s this rose to nearly 60
percent, despite drug use being on the decline nationally.13 President Reagan, along with
his wife Nancy, was very vocal of his distaste of illegal drugs and its harm to American
society. Reagan was quoted describing the drug problem, “as a much a threat to the
United States as enemy planes and missiles”14. Nancy also made similarly dramatic
statements,
Today, there’s a drug and alcohol abuse epidemic in this country, and no one is
safe from it—not you, not me and certainly not our children. Now you can see
why drug abuse concerns every one of us, all the American family.15
Nancy Reagan also created her famous “Just Say No” campaign that relied on the use of
children and celebrities as political props to further perpetuate the idea that drugs use has
become an epidemic in the country.
President Reagan used this moral panic over the use of drugs in the United States
to push many of his political initiatives. The first being the revival of mandatory
minimum drug sentencing laws. The Boggs Acts of the 1950’s was the last proposed
mandatory minimum drug sentencing laws and were quickly repealed by Congress.16

13

Kilgore, James. Understanding Mass Incarceration : A People's Guide to the Key Civil
Rights Struggle of Our Time. La Vergne: The New Press, 2015. p. 61
Hawdon, James E. “The Role of Presidential Rhetoric in the Creation of a Moral Panic:
Reagan, Bush, and the War on Drugs.” Deviant Behavior 22, no. 5 (September 30, 2001):
p. 427
14

15

16

Ibid p. 428

Henry Scott Wallace, "Mandatory Minimums and the Betrayal of Sentencing Reform A Legislative Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde," Federal Bar News & Journal 40, no. 3
(March/April 1993): p. 159
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Congress believed the sentencing guidelines to be a mistake and proved to cause
disproportionate sentencing for first time offenders. It also did not allow for the discretion
and case by case basis sentencing determined by judges. Despite this knowledge of the
past, the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act passed through Congress and implemented many
mandatory minimum penalties. It is widely believed that the reason why these policies
saw wide bipartisan support from Congress is due to the media frenzy surrounding crack
use at the time. Crack cocaine became the major talking point for most media outlets,
focusing their news coverage on inner cities. With President Reagan’s public distaste of
drugs and the media coverage surrounding the crack epidemic, it became political suicide
to not support any form of legislation that tackled drug use in America. The most
controversial penalty to come out of this period is the mandatory minimum of five years
for the possession of five grams of crack cocaine.17 In order to reach the same penalty of
five years, a person would have to have 500 grams of powdered cocaine. This
discrepancy, known as the 1:100 ratio, has been deemed intentionally racist by many
scholars as crack cocaine was widely found in African American communities due it
being much cheaper than powdered cocaine. This provision was expanded upon in with
the Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 whereby mere possession of any quantity of
crack cocaine would result in a mandatory minimum sentence of five years.18 By 1994,
every state had mandatory minimum sentencing laws in place, many for drug offenses.19

17

Ibid p. 160

18

Ibid p. 163

19

National Research Council. (2014). The Growth of Incarceration in the United States:
Exploring Causes and Consequences. Committee on Causes and Consequences of High
Rates of Incarceration, J. Travis, B. Western, and S. Redburn, Editors. Committee on
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Researchers have noted that African Americans and White Americans used cocaine at
roughly the same rate, yet African Americans were the majority of those sentenced to
serve prison time for possession and distribution. In 2006, an American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) study discovered that African Americans represented more than 80
percent of crack cocaine defendants even though whites made up almost two-thirds of the
market.20
Asset Forfeiture
In 1984, the Reagan Administration incentivized increased drug policing through
the creation of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act (CCCA). This act created the
National Assets Seizure and Forfeiture Fund, under the Department of Justice (DOJ), that
collected resources gathered through asset seizure and forfeitures. In its first year of
implementation in 1985, $27 million of assets were seized that can then be distributed to
local and federal law enforcement, creating a self-sustaining model of funding.21 The
DOJ reported in 1990 that this fund increased asset seizure and forfeiture by 1,500%
between the years of 1985 and 1990.22 The CCCA also greatly expanded what was
forfeitable stating, “all real property, ... or any lot of land and any ... improvements,
which is used, or intended to be used, ... to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a

Law and Justice, Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education. Washington,
DC: The National Academies Press.
20

Matthew D. Lassiter; Impossible Criminals: The Suburban Imperatives of America's
War on Drugs, Journal of American History, Volume 102, Issue 1, 1 June 2015, p. 131
21

Annemarie Bridy, "Carpe Omnia: Civil Forfeiture in the War on Drugs and the War on
Piracy," Arizona State Law Journal 46, no. 3 (Fall 2014):p. 695
22

Ibid p. 697
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violation of this title punishable by more than one year's imprisonment.”23 Any property
in connection or suspected to be in connection to a drug operation could be seized and the
profits are then distributed between local and federal law enforcement. The profits made
from drug related arrests slowly became top priority for many police departments, so
much so that they took precedence over other major crimes due to their lack of financial
incentive. This greatly increased policing in inner cities and aided in the disproportionate
mass incarceration of African Americans and other minorities. Racial profiling became
an issue in many cities as police officers were more likely to search African Americans
and Hispanics than whites.24 These searches resulted in disproportionate arrests and
convictions of minorities. According to the DOJ’s Bureau of Justice Statistics, the prison
population by the end of Ronald Reagan’s presidency in 1989 rose to 607,000 from
353,167 at the start of his presidency in 1981.25
The Clinton Administration
The election of democrat President Bill Clinton put an end to a long chain of
conservative Republican presidents. This upset was largely due in part to the democratic
parties changing strategy. The democratic party learned from its loss in 1988 after a
political ad run by republican candidate George H.W. Bush against democrat candidate
Michael Dukakis. The ad highlighted the case of convicted felon Willie Horton who
escaped from custody during a furlough or what is often called a home leave or a

23

Ibid p. 698

24

Marc Mauer, "Addressing Racial Disparities in Incarceration," Prison Journal 91, no. 3
Supplement (September 2011):p. 925
25

Bureau of Justice Statistics
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temporary community release. After escaping custody during this furlough, he
burglarized the home of a young couple and during the burglary raped a young woman
named Angela Miller.26 This case was used as a political attack ad against Michael
Dukakis as he was an avid supporter of furlough leaves for prison inmates. When
questioned after the incident and the attack ad he refused to change his stance. Bush
would later give a speech further attacking Dukakis stating,
What did the Democratic Governor of Massachusetts think he was doing when he
let convicted first-degree murderers out on weekend passes? Why, even after one
of the criminals that he let out brutally raped a woman and stabbed her fiancé, why
won't he admit his mistake? Eight months later he was still defending his program
and only when the Massachusetts Legislature voted by an overwhelming majority
to abolish the program for murderers, did he finally give in. I think that Governor
Dukakis owes the people of the United States of America an explanation as to why
he supported this outrageous program.27

George H.W. Bush used this fear of crime and possible racial prejudice, Willie Horton
was African American, and won the 1988 president election as the crime control
candidate.
Bill Clinton, learning from the mistakes of Dukakis, changed the typical democrat
rhetoric on crime and campaigned as being tougher on crime while also promoting more
progressive measures. Clinton campaigned to add 100,000 more police officers onto the
streets stating, “The simplest and most direct way to restore order in our cities is to put
more police on the streets”.28 At the same time Clinton differed from Republican crime

26

Skolnick, Jerome H. "Crime and the Politics of Hysteria: How the Willie horton Story
Changed American Justice." The American Prospect, no. 25 (1996)
27
Harry A. Chernoff; Christopher M. Kelly; John R. Kroger, "The Politics of Crime,"
Harvard Journal on Legislation 33, no. 2 (Spring 1996):p. 537
28

Ibid p. 543
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rhetoric by claiming that the root of crime is on the lack of jobs and opportunities for the
poorest of the nation.29 Clinton, knowingly or unknowingly, put himself in a
compromising position of attempting to please everyone. Where he often spoke of
building up communities he was also an open supporter of the death penalty. At the time
this was the ultimate determination that proves a candidate is truly tough on crime. He
would follow through on these promises with the signing of the Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, or the 1994 Crime bill for short. The bill contained a
moderate amount of community building funds but at the same time contained a three
strikes provision and a truth in sentencing provision. These provisions further increased
the prison population, but even more importantly these provisions increased time served
and dissolved parole for many inmates. Clinton became a polarizing figure as he
attempted to please both liberals and conservatives through his signing of the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994
During President Clinton's State of the Union Address he directly addressed the
issue of crime in the United States stating,
Let's give our children a future. Let us take away their guns and give them books.
Let us overcome their despair and replace it with hope. Let us, by our example,
teach them to obey the law, respect our neighbors, and cherish our values. Let us
weave these sturdy threads into a new American community that can once more
stand strong against the forces of despair and evil because everybody has a chance
to walk into a better tomorrow.30

29

Kramer, R., & Michalowski, R. (1995). The iron fist and the velvet tongue: Crime
control policies in the clinton administration. Social Justice, 22(2), pg. 3
30
Ibid p. 5
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Clinton continued to claim the idea that crime needed to be solved by using more
community development measures rather than punitive. A little later during Clinton's first
year in office, the senate proposed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
of 1994. The bill pushed to add 100,000 more police officers on the street, provide
funding for the construction of more prisons, increased death penalty offenses, increased
mandatory life imprisonment offenses, contained a three strikes provision, and contained
a truth in sentencing provision. The bill was hotly contested and shut down multiple
times throughout its development. Republicans and Democrats fought over multiple
provisions from increased community development funding to a ban on assault rifles. The
bill was eventually passed and many Democrats viewed it as a victory as it was the
largest and most expensive crime prevention bill to be passed. It totaled at $28 billion
with $9 billion going towards crime prevention programs, $13.5 billion for prison
construction, and $3.5 billion for 100,000 new police officers. One of the crime
prevention programs created provided grants for communities high in poverty and
joblessness called the Local Partnership Act. There are many other grant programs
centered around education, crime prevention, drug prevention, and gang prevention in
high risk communities. Clinton succeeded in getting his 100,000 new officers that were
focused on community policing. He also succeeded in passing a bill that in some ways
pleased both conservatives and liberals alike. The bill did however greatly add to the
issue of mass incarceration through the three-strikes and truth in sentencing provisions.
At the start of his presidency in 1993 the prison population numbered an estimated
948,881 according to a Department of Justice press release.31

31
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“Three Strikes and You’re Out” Provision
Three-strike laws refer to habitual offenders being sentenced to mandatory life in
prison after committing a violent felony and two other prior convictions. The Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement of 1994, signed by President Clinton, contains a
provision implementing three-strikes law on the federal level. Washington state was the
first state to pass a three strikes law in 1993 followed by California and Georgia.32
Opponents to the three-strikes law in Washington state prior to its implementation, a
group of prosecutors, provided a scenario,
An 18-year-old high school senior pushes a classmate down to steal his Michael
Jordan $150 sneakers-Strike One; he gets out of jail and shoplifts a jacket from the
Bon Marche, pushing aside a clerk as he runs out of the store-Strike Two; he gets
out of jail, straightens out, and nine years later gets in a fight in a bar and
intentionally hits someone, breaking his nose-criminal behavior, to be sure, but
hardly the crime of the century, yet it is Strike Three. He is sent to prison for the
rest of his life.33
This scenario demonstrates how three-strikes can inadvertently cause more harm than
good as the punishment does not necessarily fit the crime. In this particular scenario, this
young man cannot qualify for parole until he has served a minimum of 25 years in prison.
The term “violent offense” can also be interpreted in many different ways depending on
the state. On the federal level the term “violent offense” refers to,
punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more that has as
an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the

32

Cole F. Heyer, "Comparing the Strike Zones of Three Strikes and You're out Laws for
California and Georgia, the Nation's Two Heaviest Hitters," Suffolk University Law
Review 45, no. 4 (2012):p. 1221
33

Nkechi Taifa, "Three-Strikes-and-You're-Out - Mandatory Life Imprisonment for Third
Time Felons," University of Dayton Law Review 20, no. 2 (Winter 1995):p. 718
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person of another or that, by its nature involves a substantial risk that physical force
against the person of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.34

Non-violent drug offenses can result in a felony charge depending on the amount of drugs
involved. This has caused some concern among opponents of three-strike laws as lowlevel drug dealers and couriers are being sentenced to life in prison sometimes without
the possibility of parole. These laws increase the amount of time a person spends in
prison and eventually becomes a burden on the taxpayer. A provision known as the
“geriatric exception”35 gives inmates of seventy years of age who have served at least
thirty years of their sentence the opportunity to prove that they are no longer a danger to
society and be released. Three strike laws are also compounded upon with truth in
sentencing and mandatory minimums making three strike laws unnecessary.
California has become an excellent case study for why this system is failing. In
California prison overcrowding has become a major issue, and research shows that
prisons have been forced to release young offenders in order to make room for those
serving life sentences.36 Young offenders are statistically more likely to continue to
commit crime when compared to older offenders. A 2011 report by California’s
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation shows that since the implementation of
three strikes in 1994, 8813 people have been sentenced to 25 years to life in prison.37 Of

34

Ibid p. 719

35

Ibid p. 721

36

Cole F. Heyer, "Comparing the Strike Zones of Three Strikes and You're out Laws for
California and Georgia, the Nation's Two Heaviest Hitters," Suffolk University Law
Review 45, no. 4 (2012):p. 1228
37

Ibid p. 1232
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that 8813, more than 2000 were a result of a drug offense and less than one-third were
due to a violent offense.38 Like many other punitive measures to fight crime, three strikes
laws have not been reliably shown to reduce crime. Three strikes laws however, have
been shown to disproportionately affect minority communities resulting in more
minorities being sentenced to serve longer prison sentences. One studied discovered a
racial bias in sentencing stating,
race and ethnicity do play an important role in contemporary sentencing
decisions. Black and Hispanic offenders sentenced in State and Federal courts
face significantly greater odds of incarceration than similarly situated white
offenders. In some jurisdictions, they also may receive longer sentences or
differential benefits from guideline departures than their white counterparts.39
This racial bias contributes to the mass incarceration of minorities and is compounded by
the fact that most of them will have to serve their full sentence due to Truth in Sentencing
laws.
Truth in Sentencing Provision
Truth in Sentencing refers to a legislative requirement for prison inmates to serve
a majority of their prison sentence, typically 85% of their original sentence. This law
mainly applies to violent offenders and repeat offenders in order to ensure that these
inmates are serving their time and not being released on good behavior, parole, or
overcrowding. Prior to truth in sentencing laws, the majority of states used an
indeterminate sentencing system. In this system judges gave a range of years to be served
for an offense, the maximum being set by the federal guidelines. After the sentencing, a

38

39

Ibid p. 1233

Marc Mauer, "Addressing Racial Disparities in Incarceration," Prison Journal 91, no. 3
Supplement (September 2011):p. 935
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parole board would then monitor an inmates’ rehabilitation and decide whether or not
they qualify for parole. This model was rehabilitation focused and at times could be
deemed inconsistent with time served for inmates as they were on a case by case basis.
With the increase in violent crime beginning in the 1960’s many states and their voter
base wanted more consistent times served for the same crime. The general argument
being that violent inmates were being released on parole or good behavior and then
returning to their old ways of violence. Citizens wanted to be reassured that a violent
offender, even if it’s their first offense, stays in prison longer and serves their whole
sentence. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 implemented truth in sentencing for those
sent to federal prison and had them serve 85% of their sentence. Washington state would
be the first state to implement truth in sentencing in 1984. In the early 1990’s, Gallup
polls were showing that crime had become the number one concern for the majority of
Americans, particularly time served.40
The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 was in reaction to
these concerns. The Act allocated $10 billion towards states that implemented truth in
sentencing legislation. These grants were given to states in order to construct more prison
facilities. After the passing of 1994 crime bill, 29 states enacted some form of truth in
sentencing legislation and applied to receive the federal grant funding.41 25 of these states
would be successful in meeting the 85% time served requirement.42 A minority of the

40

Susan Turner; Peter W. Greenwood; Terry Fain; James R. Chiesa, "An Evaluation of
the Federal Government's Violent Offender Incarceration and Truth-in-Sentencing
Incentive Grants," Prison Journal 86, no. 3 (September 2006): p. 367
41

Ibid p. 372

42
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states claimed that the financial incentive played a role in their decision. The grant funds
were restricted to the construction of more prison beds or to even lease beds from a
private company. By the end of the grant period, 2001, around 50,000 prison beds were
constructed across the country.43 Truth in sentencing laws were created in an effort to
deter crime and prevent repeat offenses. Research shows that violent crime nationally
was already on the decline prior to the passing of the 1994 crime bill, yet the number of
people imprisoned continued to rise. Truth in sentencing does not directly correlate with
reduced crime, but it has had the effect of keeping people imprisoned longer and aided in
prison overcrowding.44 By the end of Clinton's presidency in 2001, the prison population
rose to 1,406,031 in state and federal prisons.45
Legal Discrimination
The policies just discussed focused on making sure that criminals are convicted
and remain in prison longer. What happens when they are eventually released? Convicted
felons are banned from public housing, denied access to welfare, not permitted to vote,
and are frequently overlooked for jobs. These forms of legal discrimination
disproportionately affect African Americans and Hispanics, the primary victims of the

43

Ibid p. 373

44

National Research Council. (2014). The Growth of Incarceration in the United States:
Exploring Causes and Consequences. Committee on Causes and Consequences of High
Rates of Incarceration, J. Travis, B. Western, and S. Redburn, Editors. Committee on
Law and Justice, Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education. Washington,
DC: The National Academies Press.
45
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war on drugs. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, as mentioned previously, contained a
provision concerning public housing stating,
a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant's household, or a guest or other
person under the tenant's control shall not engage in criminal activity, including
drug-related criminal activity, on or near public housing premises, while the tenant
is a tenant in public housing, and such criminal activity shall be cause for
termination of tenancy.46
This provision is in response to heavy drug use and the physical deterioration of public
housing sites during the late 1980’s. In 1996, President Clinton sought to expand upon
this provision in what he called “One Strike You’re Out”. The new legislation later
passed by Congress states,
Any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful
enjoyment of the premises by other tenants or any drug related criminal activity on
or off such premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the
tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the tenant's control, shall be
cause for termination of tenancy.47
The language changed to include any member of the tenant’s household or guest. The
boundaries for the offense were also extended meaning that the offense is no longer
simply on or near the public housing property. This means that the tenant is responsible
for every person that enters their residence. The tenants’ family member or guest does not
have to be convicted of a crime to have their residency terminated, simply arrested.
Lastly, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the department in
charge of public housing, is legally allowed to deny housing to anyone with a criminal
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record. There is little research to determine how many people are denied from public
housing due to a criminal record, but those just released from prison have little options.
In the same year, President Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act or the Welfare Act of 1996. This act contained a
provision that permanently banned anyone with a drug related felony from receiving
benefits.48 This act primarily affected African American women and their children.
Women with young children were the primary benefactors of government assistance
across racial lines. At the time, African American women made up almost 50% of the
female prisoner population.49 Most were arrested for possession or a crime to support
their addiction. With no means to support their children these women were more likely to
return to a life of crime. The issues of access to public housing and government
assistance can be traced back to policies signed by President Clinton. It is unclear
whether or not these policies were racially motivated, but they did disproportionately
affect minority communities. These issues were further compounded by legal
discrimination in employment.
All 50 states have some form of legal discrimination for ex-felons in public
employment. Ex-felons are typically barred from receiving a professional license such as
accounting or a barber’s license. Beyond that most employers will simply not hire people
with criminal records. There is a racial bias that comes into play that one researcher was
able to observe. Devah Pager published a study in 2003 that discovered employers are
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more likely to assume that African American applicants have a criminal record than
white applicants.50 They will typically confront African American applicants and ask
them up front if they have a record prior to even looking at their resume. Even when
applicants with the exact same resume and criminal background, white applicants were
more likely to receive call backs. This study is the first of its kind to prove a link between
incarceration and unemployment. These policies, and all the others discussed, were
created as deterrents to crime but have only resulted in increased recidivism. A large
percentage of inmates released from prison that face these legal forms of
decriminalization will ultimately return to prison.51 The vast majority of these repeat
offenders will be African American. African Americans make up 40% of the entire prison
population while only representing 12% of the U.S. population.52 African American men
are also six times more likely to be imprisoned when compared to white males. 1 in every
3 African American men on average are imprisoned as compared to 1 in every 17-white
male.53 This cycle of release, discrimination, and rearrests is the reason that these
percentages are so high and will continue to remain high. This cycle began with the onset
of the war on drugs through increased policing of inner cities and incentivized asset
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forfeiture. Long prison sentences and the removal of many privileges as a U.S. citizen
were meant to ensure a drop in the crime rate. Is mass incarceration responsible for the
drastic drop in crime that we see today? Is it appropriate to say that these punitive
responses are justifiable?
Decline in Crime
In the United States virtually all forms of crime have reached all-time lows. Since
the 1990’s violent crime has dropped by nearly 70% and burglary has dropped by nearly
50%.54 Some researchers attempt to attribute this drop in overall crime to the increased
use of incarceration. However, a cross national study concluded that Canada and the U.S.
experienced very similar drops in crime during the 1990’s, despite Canada not increasing
their use of incarceration during this period. There are numerous theories as to why crime
dropped so rapidly across the board. The most popular theories include the growth of the
economy, an aging population, policing strategies, and the development of security
technology. Of all the theories presented the development of security technologies is
believed to have the most influence on the crime rate. Anti-theft systems for cars and
home security systems are considered greater deterrents to crime than increased punitive
policies and increased policing. These developments can be seen across multiple western
nations that experienced a drop-in crime. It is one of the few similarities that the nations
had during this time period. No other nation increased policing and incarceration
comparable to the U.S. yet they experienced roughly the same decrease in crime. Mass
incarceration has not been linked to decreased crime in the U.S. and has played a very
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minimal role as an effective crime deterrent. Despite the steep drop in crime in the U.S.
the prison population continued to grow throughout the 1990’s and early 2000’s.

II. The Rise of Prison Privatization
Prison privatization to many is a modern problem that just emerged in recent
years in the media. In actuality, prison privatization began in the early 1980’s and
reached its peak of profitability during the late 1990’s and early 2000’s. The first private
prison company in the United States was called Corrections Corporation of America
(CCA), now known as CoreCivic, that started in 1983.55 It was started by the former chair
of the Tennessee Republican Party, Thomas Beasley. Beasley partnered with venture
capitalist Jack Massey.56 Massey was best known for funding the creation of another
private company known as Hospital Corporation of America with Beasley creating the
model for its operation. Hospital Corporation of America (HCA) privatized medical
facilities and Beasley saw an opportunity to do the same with prisons. Beasley was so
confident in the idea of selling prisons he described it as, “CCA will be to jails and
prisons that are owned and managed by local, state, and federal governments what
Hospital Corporation of America has become to medical facilities nationwide”.57 CCA
received its first contract from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and was
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tasked with building a facility to detain undocumented immigrants in Houston, Texas in
1984. CCA had a rough start with no prior experience in corrections. One of the cofounders of CCA, T Don. Hutto, was a corrections professional who had run the
Arkansas prison system in the late 1970’s but did not have the most favorable track
record. The Supreme Court found that the Arkansas prison system was guilty of “cruel
and unusual punishment” after reports of rape, torture, and high working hours for
inmates.58 Despite all of this, CCA was still trusted to construct the detention center.
They originally failed to construct a facility in time so they leased a motel and repurposed
it to fit their needs.59 CCA would move on to gain more contracts from INS, gain
contracts for multiple juvenile detention centers, and pre-release centers. In only a matter
of a couple of years CCA was quickly turning a profit and went as far as to attempt to
purchase the entire state prison system of Tennessee for $100 million.60 Tennessee, like
many other states, was struggling to deal with prison overcrowding and was federal
mandated to reduce overcrowding. Prison overcrowding became a major problem during
the 1980’s and the Supreme Court ruled that prison overcrowding can constitute a
violation of the Eighth Amendment in certain situations.61 This fear of violating prisoners
eighth amendment rights and budgetary constraints made private prison companies more
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appealing. More companies began to spring up around the country. The second largest
company to come out of this time was called Wackenhut Corrections Corporation, better
known now as The GEO Group. CCA and GEO Group would go on to become the two
biggest private prison companies in the nation operating 132 prisons, as of 2014, and
generate over $3 billion in revenue each year.62
Private prison companies have been operating in the country and turning a profit
for over 30 years now. It is important to research the history of these companies because
their actions and influence has continued to perpetuate the issue of mass incarceration.
Private prisons stand in the way of meaningful legislative reform that can reduce the
prison population. In the past they have been quietly in the background influencing
politicians and legislation. Private prison companies have a financial incentive to
continue perpetuating longer prison sentences for inmates. These companies turn a profit
through state and government contracts that often include occupancy quotas. The state
and federal government sign contracts that often seek a 90% occupancy rate at all times,
and if they fail to reach this goal the companies can charge heavy fines.63 These
companies rely on the continued issue of prison overcrowding and budgetary constraints
to ensure that they remain in business. Where the war on drugs and tough on crime
policies resulted in mass incarceration, private prison companies seek to maintain these
policies and even expand them for their own financial gain. CCA and The GEO Group
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have gone as far as lobbying for legislation that increases prison terms, making campaign
contributions, and sometimes paying off judges and other legal figures to gain contracts.
Lobbying Efforts and Campaign Contributions
Our industry benefits from significant economies of scale, resulting in lower
operating costs per inmate as occupancy rates increase. We believe we have been
successful in increasing the number of residents in our care and continue to pursue
a number of initiatives intended to further increase our occupancy and revenue. Our
competitive cost structure offers prospective customers a compelling option for
incarceration.64

This is a direct quote from a CCA annual report to their shareholders explaining to them
how they will continue to lobby for legislation that increases the number of inmates in their
facilities. It is estimated that CCA and The GEO Group paid over $4 million in campaign
contributions between the years of 2003 and 2012.65 CCA and the GEO Group are also
members of a very exclusive private interest group called the American Legislative
Exchange Council (ALEC). ALEC writes and proposes model legislation to lawmakers
and corporate sponsors.66 ALEC members consist of conservative lawmakers and
representatives from major corporations like Wells Fargo, Walmart, Coca Cola, CCA, and
many more. Out of 825 bills that were written and proposed by ALEC to lawmakers, they
successfully passed 115 bills in 2009.67 Many of these bills were written to increase the
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prison population, increase time served, and promote greater use of private prisons. These
bills benefited companies that provided food and services for inmates, companies that use
inmate labor, and directly benefited private prison companies like CCA.68 ALEC has had
a hand in writing many bills that were previously discussed such as mandatory minimums,
truth in sentencing, and three strikes laws as the group has been operating since 1973. The
group manages to stay out of the public eye due to the fact that lawmakers present these
bills as their own, not as being written by ALEC and their team of researchers. ALEC
makes an estimated $25 million a year from corporate sponsorship on top of the $7,000$25,000 membership fee that corporations have to pay in order to gain access to these
meetings.69 CCA and other private prison companies not only make large campaign
contributions to lawmakers, but they are also members of this private interest group
ensuring that these companies continue to make a profit for years to come.
Cost Savings
The allure of private prison contracts for many states was the idea that the
taxpayer would be saving money in the long run. That the private sector could operate
and manage prisons more effectively and cheaper. The research that has been done to
determine whether private prisons are cheaper than state or federally operated prisons has
been inconclusive. There are some researchers finding that privately operated prisons are
cheaper, but the researchers behind these studies were found to be paid and funded by the
private prison industry.70 The latest example of this came from two economic professors
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from Temple University that released a study finding private prison cost savings in 2014.
They did not disclose that they received funding from CCA and the GEO Group until
after the study was published.71 The vast majority of research concerning privatization
savings have found very minimal cost savings and, in some cases, have been shown to be
more expensive than state operated facilities. Private prison companies use a couple of
strategies to shift their costs back onto the state. The first being that these companies,
based on their contracts, can strategically pick and choose the inmates they wish to house
in their facilities. These companies choose minimal security, healthy, and non-violent
inmates in order to save money on security and medical costs.72 A report conducted in
2004 concerning the security disparity among inmates in state and private prisons stated,
The private sector houses approximately 21% fewer inmates at the maximum and
close security levels and approximately 15% more inmates at the minimum-security
level than does the public sector. Thus, 90% of the private sector's inmate
population is classified at the medium or minimum levels, whereas only 69% of the
public sector's inmate population are so designated.73

Private prison companies also make note in their contracts with states that they are not
financially responsible for inmates that have serious medical conditions like HIV or
AIDS.74 If the facility does take in inmates that have these medical conditions they often
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have caps on the amount of medical expenses one inmate can have before the state has to
begin paying the bill.75 Finally in the majority of contracts, the transportation of inmates to
and from private facilities is paid by the state.76 This is very much apparent in the case of
Hawaii as one third of its inmates are sent to private facilities on the mainland. Many states
fail to realize that all of these costs add up and result in them paying more than just housing
the inmates themselves. These costs don’t necessarily apply to every state that contracts
private companies and at the moment it is difficult for researchers to accurately side one
way or the other on the issue of cost effectiveness. There are many factors that come into
play such as prison population, medical costs, transportation costs, and security costs. No
two facilities are the same and this makes cost comparisons difficult. These are just the
actions of private companies to shift their expenses on to the state in order to appear as a
cheaper alternative. Beyond this, private companies take measures to cut costs in areas that
affect the safety and wellbeing of their inmates in order to maintain profits.
Security, Escapes, and Inmate Violence
In order for private prison companies to maintain their profitability they have to
make budget cuts in vital areas regarding the wellbeing of their inmates and their
security. Private prison companies often advertise their services by claiming that they can
maintain and operate a facility with less manpower than a state-run facility. This cut to
the number of correctional officers means that they save in wages, training, and benefits
as one researcher notes,
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The cost-cutting focus of private corporations translates to reduced staffing levels,
reduced investment in training of prison guards, increased ratios of inmates to
correctional officers, and lower wages for private correctional officers. Low pay,
poor training, and high turnover may contribute to higher levels of violence in the
private sector prisons. This may in turn encourage private prison employees to
violate prisoners' rights-rights that would be better safeguarded if government
employees in government-run facilities guarded the prisoners. This is the
predicament of the privately housed federal prisoner.77

The staffing model that these facilities use is not on the public record and the inmate to
correctional officer ratio is often not disclosed. These facilities claim to not release this
information due to it being a “trade secret”.78 This information is vital to researchers
seeking to make cost comparisons as labor makes up the majority of prison costs. A
report in 2005 is the latest information available concerning prison inmate to officer ratio
and it found that there were 7.1 inmates per officer on average in private facilities.79 This
is well above the national standard of 2 to 1 ratio in state prisons. This disparity between
inmates and officers has led to numerous national headlines reporting escapes, violence,
and abuse. The most notable story came out of Arizona in 2010 where three inmates
escaped from a Management and Training Company (MTC) operated facility. One of the
inmates prior to being recaptured was connected to the murder of an elderly couple
whose bodies were burned inside a trailer in New Mexico.80 The inmates were able to
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escape due to there being no security guards posted near one of the perimeter gates, the
security system was not maintained, and non-operational flood lights.81 Another famous
incident occurred at Idaho Correction Center operated by CCA. The facility gained a
reputation among inmates due to its lack of staffing and rampant violence often referring
to the facility as “gladiator school”82 . There were many rival gangs in the facility and the
correctional officers would often allow gang violence to persist as a way of maintaining
order. Researchers have discovered that the rate of escapes, inmate to inmate violence,
and guard to inmate violence is higher in private prisons compared to state prisons.83
Overwhelmed staff eventually quit and this results in a high turnover rate within these
facilities and ultimately a lack of experienced staff. This inexperienced staff struggle to
handle inmate disputes and often resort to violence and are inexperienced in terms of
oversight overlooking drug use, escapes, and violence.84 This is only one way that
private prison companies cut costs to operate their facilities.
Medical Care
Medical care for inmates is by far the biggest expense for state and federal
prisons. With many of the same reasons for states moving their inmates to private
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prisons, state prisons often outsource their medical care to private companies. Private
medical care providers serve state, federal, and private prisons as a means to lower
healthcare costs. These companies are paid and make a profit in two distinct models. The
first and most favorable for these companies is the flat rate model where the company is
given an annual budget and any funds that are not spent on inmates turns to profit. This
model incentives the company to keep costs as low as possible to retain as much of their
budget and turn it to profit. The second model is the cost-plus model where the company
is reimbursed for its medical expenses and paid extra for profit.85 These companies are
not too dissimilar to private prisons as they suffer from many of the same issues. In order
to turn a profit, they are typically understaffed and experience high turnover rates from
their doctors and nurses.86 There are numerous private healthcare providers seeking state
and federal contracts all advertising that they can do the job cheaper and more effective
than the other. One of the largest private healthcare providers is Corizon Healthcare
which was recently created through the merger of two large providers; Prison Healthcare
Services (PHS) and Correctional Medical Services (CMS). Corizon Healthcare provides
medical care to an estimated 271,000 inmates in twenty-nine states and 285 correctional
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facilities.87 Prior to the merger, PHS had numerous medical scandals in the state of New
York.
Brian Tetrault was arrested after stealing a pair of skis from his ex-wife and was
sent to county jail in New York in 2001. Tetrault suffered from Parkinson's disease and
was denied the necessary medication to treat it due to the cost. His health began to
rapidly deteriorate and nurses refused to give him the necessary medication believing that
he was faking his condition. After ten days of not receiving his medication Tetrault died
of septic shock in his cell.88 The New York State Commission of Corrections reported,
“the lack of credentials, lack of training, shocking incompetence and outright misconduct
of the doctors and nurses . . . was emblematic of PHS's conduct as a business corporation,
holding itself out as a medical care provider while seemingly bereft of any quality
control”.89 This report came after the commission connected PHS to more than 20 deaths
in state facilities. The commission also discovered that PHS frequently hired doctors and
psychiatrists with foreign credentials, criminal convictions, and some that were forbidden
to practice in other states.90 Experienced doctors shy away from working in prisons as
there is a risk of violence and the conditions have been described as, “prison health
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facilities are typically poorly equipped, poorly ventilated, poorly lit, and run-down.”91
The nursing staff was frequently undertrained and in one incident a prenatal nurse
allowed an infant to die after only being trained through an email with instructions from a
university website.92 At Rikers Island, PHS understaffed their doctors and psychiatrists
and avoided any penalties for doing so through the practice of “floating”. This practice
refers to the constant shifting and moving of doctors and psychiatrists from building to
building to appear fully staffed at all times.93 PHS used these types of tactics often to
avoid fines and even encouraged employees stating, “put your best face forward, hide as
many problems as you can and hang on to the contract for as long as you can”.94 PHS
would maintain their contracts in New York as the state is mandated to contract with the
lowest cost provider.95 There is a very limited number of providers of healthcare
currently and with the merger of PHS and CMS to create Corizon Healthcare, states are
left with little options. With cuts to medical care in facilities, private prisons have also cut
funding to rehabilitation efforts and this has resulted in increased recidivism rates.
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Rehabilitation and Recidivism
Private prison companies do not pride themselves on their rehabilitation and the
reeducation of their inmates as it is counterintuitive to their business model. It is in their
best interest to cut funding for rehabilitation programs to both decrease overhead costs
and increase recidivism rates. In 2010, the ABA Criminal Justice Section released a
report that best explains this predicament stating,
A concern with for-profit detention centers is that their private "profit" interest is
not aligned with the public interest in rehabilitating and lowering recidivism rates
among juvenile offenders. A for-profit model incentivizes detainment for
financial profit, whereas public policy does not. Public policy interprets
detainment as a means by which a child offender is punished and rehabilitated.
Contrastingly, a for-profit model views detainment as a mechanism by which
profit goals are met. This contrast in interpretation results in a direct conflict with
the public purpose, and it is this direct conflict that creates undesirable results.96
Reports concerning recidivism comparisons between private and state operated prisons
are limited due to private companies withholding records. An independent study
comparing recidivism rates between state and private facilities in Oklahoma concluded,
“private prison inmate groups had a greater hazard of recidivism than did public inmate
groups”.97 More research needs to be conducted to accurately conclude that recidivism
rates are higher in private prisons. In terms of their business model, it is one of the best
ways to ensure continued profits. Private prisons also generate profits through the use of
prison labor.
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Prison Labor
“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or
any place subject to their jurisdiction.”98 The Thirteenth Amendment has been debated by
proponents of the use of inmate labor for decades claiming private companies and the
corrections facilities themselves profit from underpaid labor. The Prison Industry
Enhancement Certification Program (PIECP) created in 1979, allowed state correctional
facilities to contract with private companies to run manufacturing and other services
within the prison.99 In order for a state prison to qualify for this program they must first
determine what company they wish to partner with. The prison has to ensure the
government that its inmates are not taking away work from the local area. Typically, the
companies that these prisons contract with are seeking to compete with foreign labor
markets such as Mexico and China.100 PIECP was created as a form of rehabilitation for
inmates and a way to offset the costs of incarceration. The program is voluntary for
inmates and the allure is to be able to send money to their families despite being in
prison. A portion of their wages is sent to their families, another is collected for room and
board, victim restitution, and lastly state and federal taxes.101 After all of these deductions
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the prison is mandated, by PIECP, to reserve 20% for the inmate. From the creation of
the program in 1979 to 2005 the program generated millions in victim restitution, family
support, federal and state taxes, and funds towards the cost of incarceration.102 The
program in some states has been shown to successfully lower recidivism rates and
improve chances of employment post release.103 The major downside to this program is
that states that are not certified under PIECP cannot sell inmate produced goods out of
their state. For many facilities this isn't a problem, but this directly affects the wages of
the inmates that can go as low as $0.17 to $5.35 an hour. 104 The benefits of this program
do not translate over to private facilities however.
Private prisons are not held to the same standards as state prisons and can
circumvent many of the restrictions placed by PIECP. The argument being that private
prisons are under public contracts and this effectively makes the use of prison labor
publicly supervised and accepted. One researcher notes, “Under the auspices of prison
privatization, crime and criminals become engines of private investment .... For
shareholders in private prison companies, inmates have quite literally become
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commodities rather than liabilities.”105 The use of cheap prison labor by private

companies further increases their profitability. Unlike state prisons, these facilities do not
use prison labor as a means to rehabilitate prisoners or reduce recidivism rates. They are
used as another form of generating profits and reduce overhead costs. Private facilities
have also been shown to pay their inmates far less than state facilities at $0.17 cents an
hour for six-hour days and $0.50 being the highest paid per hour by CCA operated
facilities.106 Major companies that also happen to be members of ALEC, such as IBM and
Walmart, benefit greatly from continued mass incarceration and cheap prison labor.

III. Return to Detention Centers
Private prison companies have come under heavy scrutiny for their political
connections, questionable business practices, cost effectiveness, and quality in recent
years. In 2011, there was a nationwide movement called the National Prison Industry
Divestment Campaign. Protesters gathered in multiple cities to protest against CCA and
GEO Groups large corporate backers like Wells Fargo Bank.107 CCA also faced legal
trouble after a lawsuit was filed by former inmates of their Idaho “gladiator school”. The
former inmates are suing after they were attacked by a rival gang due to a lack of guards
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on duty. An FBI investigation was conducted after the inmates reported that CCA was
falsifying staffing hours.108 Numerous legal battles and public scrutiny has forced CCA
and the GEO Group to return to where they both started, immigrant detention centers.
Many of the same issues that inmates of private prisons face are arguably worse in
immigrant detention centers. Immigrants are not granted legal counsel and are often
forced to represent themselves resulting in detainment and deportation. CCA and GEO
Group create detention facilities that are not very different to the state prisons they
construct, despite these facilities housing primarily families with young children.
Healthcare is bare minimal and, in some cases, detainees are not granted access to a
trained medical professional. Immigrants are given the opportunity to work for pennies
by the hour assuming they are providing for their families. Finally, many immigrants are
detained for months or even years in inhumane conditions waiting for their deportation
hearing.
Tough on Immigration
The mass detention of illegal immigrants followed a very similar progression to
that of prison inmates. In the early 1990’s immigrants, particularly from Mexico, began
immigrating in mass to the United States following the passing of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This allowed American agricultural businesses to
purchase land in Mexico operated by local families. This displacement resulted in many
Mexicans immigrating to the U.S. in search of work.109 In response to this mass influx of
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immigrants the U.S. heavily stigmatized immigrants in order to pass punitive legislation.
Immigrants were described as burdens to taxpayers as they overcrowded public schools,
accessed healthcare, and took jobs away from Americans.110 Illegal immigrants were also
linked to the drug trade and this influenced the proceeding legislation. The Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) and the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) were passed in 1996.111 These acts vastly
increased the number of deportable offenses many being non-violent misdemeanors.
IIRIRA specifically called for mandatory detention of immigrants prior to their
deportation. Mandatory detention is deemed as a civil process whereby immigrants wait
for their deportation hearing and after their deportation itself. This provision is largely
responsible for the issue of mass detention of immigrants. Finally, the IIRIRA contained
a provision that required the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to consider
contracting private prison companies in order to deal the influx of immigrant detainees.
By 2012, DHS reported detaining more than 400,000 immigrants in its facilities more
than any other nation in the world. 112
Privatization
For-profit prisons did not enter the immigrant detention business based on a track
record of successfully providing detention services. The rise of this industry has
been attributed to a combination of factors, including the trend toward
privatization of government services, the ability of private contractors to create
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detention capacity more rapidly than government . . . , rising demand for
detention and prison beds . . . , and the lack of accountability to DHS-ICE by state
and local contractors.113

The annual cost to detain illegal immigrants is well over two billion dollars and
companies like CCA and the GEO Group use the same lobbying strategies to continue the
flow of federal contracts.
The most famous case of CCA lobbying for increased immigration
criminalization is SB 1070 in Arizona. “The Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe
Neighborhoods Act,” or S.B. 1070 allowed for the legal racial profiling of suspected
illegal immigrants.114 Law enforcement could ask anyone they deemed suspicious for
their proof of citizenship under this law. The bill was written by ALEC and was heavily
supported by CCA.115 The bill was also widely supported by the voters of Arizona
believing that immigrants were invading their state. Georgia followed suit with their own
bill called “Show Me Your Papers” or H.B. 87. This billed forced businesses in the state
to verify their employees’ citizenship. This bill was focused on removing immigrants
from the workplace and imprisoning them with charges of up to ten years for falsified
documents.116 Any immigrants that were caught with a falsified social security number
were handed over to one of the six CCA facilities in Georgia. Lastly, Alabama passed
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H.B. 56 that was in some ways a combination of the previous two. One provision that
Alabama did add was that children of undocumented parents would no longer be allowed
to attend public schools in the state. Just like the last two bills, Alabama's was written by
ALEC and supported by CCA. These policies ensured CCA’s business model would
continue to generate revenue not too dissimilar to their campaigns for three strikes and
mandatory minimums. CCA and other companies will continue this cycle of advocating
from increased criminalization for the sake of profits. Immigrants unfortunately have a
harder time of defending themselves due to their lack of rights only granted to citizens.
Detention facilities are built and operated much in same way as prisons despite it
being considered a civil process. Immigrants that are detained in these facilities have very
limited protections and are not granted legal counsel.117 Immigrants are not given legal
counsel due to the ruling that immigration hearings are a civil process not criminal.
Because of these restrictions, immigrants frequently represent themselves during
deportation hearings and often lose their cases. Private companies turn a profit from these
facilities virtually the same way they do for prisons. They receive Immigration and
Custom Enforcement (ICE) contracts and use cost cutting measures to increase profits.
One cost cutting measure they use is the lack of legal libraries or resources within their
facilities. With better access to legal resources, immigrants have a slightly better chance
of representing themselves during their deportation hearing and potentially be released.

117

Kimberly R. Hamilton, "Immigrant Detention Centers in the United States and
International Human Rights Law," Berkeley La Raza Law Journal 21 (2011): 94

MASS INCARCERATION

45

Conditions
Privately operated facilities are not directly monitored by ICE and this greatly
increases the chances of civil and human rights abuses.118 ICE also does not enforce any
form of codable standards and regulations that private companies have to follow.119 This
lack of oversight of privately operated facilities has resulted in under trained staff, staff
shortages, food shortages, medical abuse and neglect, and poor sanitation in some
facilities.120 In one case a woman suffering from arthritis was not receiving timely
medical assistance and decided to sign her deportation order despite wishing to stay in the
country.121 Many detainees cannot handle the conditions within these facilities as they
resemble prisons. Many of the facilities were once prisons or were constructed similar to
prisons. The average detainee is detained for five months and the longest being up to
three years.122 With wait times that can last years for some people, private companies
make a fortune. There are a large number of detainee deaths within these facilities that
were preventable with adequate medical care. Many deaths go unreported or are
misreported, this being due to the lack of federally mandated medical standards.123 Many
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detainees suffer from depression, post-traumatic stress, and thoughts of suicide. The lack
of medical care has resulted in high suicide rates among detainees.124 These conditions
are incredibly punitive and inhumane for people who are said to be a part of a civil
process.
In some instances, detainees are being forced into working in the Voluntary
Worker Program. This program allows inmates to work for as little as a dollar a day or
.13 cents an hour. Some people do volunteer for this program to at least provide
something for their families. The tasks usually range from cleaning sells, giving haircuts,
and general maintenance. There are have been reported cases of people being threatened
with solitary confinement if they refuse to work.125 In another case a detainee was injured
from the previous day of labor and was forced by guards to continue working despite the
injuries.126 Companies save money by not having to hire minimum wage workers to
maintain the facilities through maintenance and cleaning. With the election of President
Trump and his current stance on illegal immigration, it is very likely that CCA and other
companies will continue to profit from detainees for years to come.
Conclusion
The rise of mass incarceration can be traced back to the Nixon, Reagan, and
Clinton administrations. The fear of increased drug use and the tough on crime rhetoric
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won elections. Policies that strayed away from rehabilitation and focused primarily on
increased criminality dramatically increased the prison population. These laws, whether
intentional or not, primarily affected African American and Latino communities. These
policies created a segregated class of ex-felons that have limited rights as U.S. citizens.
The justification for this being a deterrent to future crime, but it leaves ex-felons with
little options and many return to a life of crime to survive. These policies show little
correlation to the overall decrease in crime nationally. The overpopulation of state and
federal prisons resulted in the outsourcing of a traditionally governmental function.
The private prison industry responded to the call of overcrowding and budgetary
cuts. These companies directly benefited from harsh sentencing laws and longer prison
sentences. In some instances, these companies successfully worked behind the scenes
through lobbying and campaign contributions to pass bills that directly contributed to the
increase in the prison population. In order to maximize profits, they also resorted to
numerous cost cutting measures striping staff, routine maintenance, and medical care to
the bare minimum. These measures would not go unnoticed and increasingly the public
began to distrust their claims of cost effectiveness and quality control. Lawsuits and
public protests forced these companies to shift back to immigration detention centers
where the inmates were less vocal of their conditions and treatment.
The United States has begun detaining more immigrants than ever before. With
the same justification of deterring other offenders. Using the same tactics and cost cutting
measures private companies began to return to operating detention centers. These
companies lobbied for numerous state bills that legalized racial profiling and
discrimination against Hispanics. Their cost cutting measures have resulted in numerous
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deaths of innocent people. These companies will continue to prosper in our current
political climate whether its private prisons or immigration detention centers.

49

MASS INCARCERATION
Bibliography

Aman, Alfred C. Jr; Greenhouse, Carol J. "Prison Privatization and Inmate Labor in the
Global Economy: Reframing the Debate over Private Prisons," Fordham Urban
Law Journal 42, no. 2 (December 2014): 355-410
Arrocha, William "From Arizona's S.B. 1070 to Georgia's H.B. 87 and Alabama's H.B.
56: Exacerbating the Other and Generating New Discourses and Practices of
Segregation," California Western Law Review 48, no. 2 (Spring 2012): 245-278
Boone, R. (2016, Jul 07). Private prison company CCA to face trial in violence lawsuit.
AP English Language News (Includes AP 50 State Report) Retrieved from
http://cupdx.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/180237
3939?accountid=10248
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p2581.pdf
Bridy, Annemarie "Carpe Omnia: Civil Forfeiture in the War on Drugs and the War on
Piracy," Arizona State Law Journal 46, no. 3 (Fall 2014): 683-728
Chernoff, Harry: Kelly, Christopher: Kroger, John "The Politics of Crime," Harvard
Journal on Legislation 33, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 527-580
Cooper, Rebecca: Heldman, Caroline: Ackerman, Alissa R & Meyers, Victoria A. Farrar
(2016) Hidden corporate profits in the U.S. prison system: the unorthodox policymaking of the American Legislative Exchange Council, Contemporary Justice
Review, 19:3, 380-400, DOI: 10.1080/10282580.2016.1185949
Cummings, Andre Douglas Pond "All Eyez on Me: America's War on Drugs and the
Prison-Industrial Complex," Journal of Gender, Race & Justice 15, no. 3 (Spring
2012): 417-448

MASS INCARCERATION

50

Ewert, Michelle Y. "One Strike and You're out of Public Housing: How the Intersection
of the War on Drugs and Federal Housing Policy Violated Due Process and Fair
Housing Principles," Harvard Journal on Racial & Ethnic Justice 32 (2016): 57102
Farrell, Graham: Tilley, Nick: Tseloni, Andromachi "Why the Crime Drop," Crime and
Justice: A Review of Research 43 (2014): 421-490
Friedmann, Alex "Apples-to-Fish: Public and Private Prison Cost Comparisons,"
Fordham Urban Law Journal 42, no. 2 (December 2014): 503-568
Garfinkel, Seth H. "The Voluntary Work Program: Expanding Labor Laws to Protect
Detained Immigrant Workers," Case Western Reserve Law Review 67, no. 4
(Summer 2017): 1287-1326
Godsoe, Cynthia "The Ban on Welfare for Felony Drug Offenders: Giving a New
Meaning to Life Sentence," Berkeley Women's Law Journal 13, no. 1 (1998):
257-267
Gottschalk, M. (2011), The past, present, and future of mass incarceration in the United
States. Criminology & Public Policy, 10: 483–504. doi:10.1111/j.17459133.2011.00755.x
Hamilton, Kimberly R. "Immigrant Detention Centers in the United States and
International Human Rights Law," Berkeley La Raza Law Journal 21 (2011): 93132
Handley, Joel. 2011. "Divesting from Private Prisons." In these Times, 08, 8-9.
http://cupdx.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/881340
512?accountid=10248.

MASS INCARCERATION

51

Hawdon, James E (2010) the role of presidential rhetoric in the creation of a moral panic:
reagan, bush, and the war on drugs, Deviant Behavior, 22:5, 419-445, DOI:
10.1080/01639620152472813
Hernandez, Cesar Cuauhtemoc Garcia "Immigration Detention as Punishment,"
Immigration and Nationality Law Review 35 (2014): 385-454
Heyer, Cole F. "Comparing the Strike Zones of Three Strikes and You're out Laws for
California and Georgia, the Nation's Two Heaviest Hitters," Suffolk University
Law Review 45, no. 4 (2012): 1217-1248
Hunt, Cecil J. II "The Jim Crow Effect: Denial, Dignity, Human Rights, and Racialized
Mass Incarceration," Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development 29, no.
1 (Fall 2016): 15-50
Jefferson, Anne C. "Rehabilitating Prison Contracting: States Must Reclaim Prison
Management and Emphasize Inmate Rehabilitation through Utilization of
Schedule Contracts for State-Run Prison Procurement," Public Contract Law
Journal 47, no. 1 (Fall 2017): 101-122
Kang, Susan (2009) Forcing Prison Labor: International Labor Standards, Human Rights
and the Privatization of Prison Labor in the Contemporary United States*, New
Political Science, 31:2, 137-161, DOI: 10.1080/07393140902872245
Kilgore, James. Understanding Mass Incarceration : A People's Guide to the Key Civil
Rights Struggle of Our Time. La Vergne: The New Press, 2015. Accessed
November 2, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central
Kramer, R., & Michalowski, R. (1995). The iron fist and the velvet tongue: Crime control
policies in the clinton administration. Social Justice, 22(2), pg. 3. Retrieved from

MASS INCARCERATION

52

Kramer, Ronald and Raymond Michalowski. "The Iron Fist and the Velvet Tongue:
Crime Control Policies in the Clinton Administration." Social Justice22, no. 2
(Summer, 1995): 87.
Lassiter, Matthew D.; Impossible Criminals: The Suburban Imperatives of America's
War on Drugs, Journal of American History, Volume 102, Issue 1, 1 June 2015,
Pages 126–140,
Marion, Ryan S "Prisoners for Sale: Making the Thirteenth Amendment Case against
State Private Prison Contracts," William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 18, no. 1
(October 2009): 213-248
Mauer, Marc "Addressing Racial Disparities in Incarceration," Prison Journal 91, no. 3
Supplement (September 2011): 87S-101S
Nkechi Taifa, "Three-Strikes-and-You're-Out - Mandatory Life Imprisonment for Third
Time Felons," University of Dayton Law Review 20, no. 2 (Winter 1995): p. 718
Patrisia Macias-Rojas, "Immigration and the War on Crime: Law and Order Politics and
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,"
Journal on Migration and Human Security 6, no. 1 (2018): 1-25
Riddhi Mukhopadhyay, "Death in Detention: Medical and Mental Health Consequences
of Indefinite Detention of Immigrants in the United States," Seattle Journal for
Social Justice 7, no. 2 (Spring/Summer 2009): 693-736
Segall, Jordan "Mass Incarceration, Ex-Felon Discrimination & Black Labor Market,"
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Law and Social Change 14, no. 1 (2011):
159-182

MASS INCARCERATION

53

Semanchik, David A. "Prison Overcrowding in the United States: Judicial and
Legislative Remedies," New England Journal on Criminal and Civil Confinement
16, no. 1 (Winter 1990): 67-88
Sinha, Anita "Arbitrary Detention: The Immigration Detention Bed Quota," Duke Journal
of Constitutional Law & Public Policy 12, no. 2 (2016): 77-122
Skolnick, Jerome H. "Crime and the Politics of Hysteria: How the Willie horton Story
Changed American Justice." The American Prospect, no. 25 (1996)
Torrey, Philip L. "Rethinking Immigration's Mandatory Detention Regime: Politics,
Profit, and the Meaning of Custody," University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform 48, no. 4 (Summer 2015): 879-914
Wallace, Henry "Mandatory Minimums and the Betrayal of Sentencing Reform - A
Legislative Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde," Federal Bar News & Journal 40, no. 3
(March/April 1993): 158-166
Whitehouse, Mary Rose "Modern Prison Labor: A Reemergence of Convict Leasing
under the Guide of Rehabilitation and Private Enterprises," Loyola Journal of
Public Interest Law 18, no. 1 (Spring 2017): 89-[x]
Wood, E., Werb, D., Marshall, B. D. L., Montaner, J. S. G., & Kerr, T. (2009). The war
on drugs: A devastating public-policy disaster. The Lancet, 373(9668), 989-90.

